Although research reveals that children as young as 3 can use deception and will take steps to obscure truth, research concerning how well others detect children's deceptive efforts remains unclear. Yet adults regularly assess whether children are telling the truth in a variety of contexts, including at school, in the home, and in legal settings, particularly in investigations of maltreatment. We conducted a meta-analysis to synthesize extant research concerning adults' ability to detect deceptive statements produced by children. We included 45 experiments involving 7,893 adult judges and 1,858 children. Overall, adults could accurately discriminate truths/lies at an average rate of 54%, which is slightly but significantly above chance levels. The average rate at which true statements were correctly classified as honest was higher (63.8%), whereas the rate at which lies were classified as dishonest was not different from chance (47.5%). A small positive correlation emerged between judgment confidence and judgment accuracy. Professionals (e.g., social workers, police officers, teachers) slightly outperformed laypersons (e.g., college undergraduates). Finally, exploratory analyses revealed that the child's age did not significantly affect the rate at which adults could discriminate truths/lies from chance. Future research aimed toward improving lie detection accuracy might focus more on individual differences in children's lie-telling abilities in order to uncover any reliable indicators of deception.
Deception is an intentional act designed to impart a belief that the communicator knows is not true (Vrij, 2008) . Deception is not categorically considered to be a negative act, and people lie for a range of prosocial reasons, including to minimize conflict in social interactions, to avoid hurt feelings, or to self-protect from negative evaluations by others (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996 ). Yet, deception may also be used with the explicit intent to hide a transgression, hurt another, avoid punishment, or other negative consequences. In the latter situations, determining truth can be essential, as the lie could have serious negative social, ethical, and legal implications, for instance, in situations in which abuse has been alleged and a legal case may ensue.
Although there are numerous studies that have examined whether people can in fact detect deception in children, results seem to vary widely, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding adults' deception detection abilities. One particularly effective way of integrating results of studies to enable clearer identification of important trends, as well as the magnitude of those trends, involves combining independent results via a meta-analysis. We took this approach in the present study in order to summarize extant results concerning adults' ability to detect children's deceptive statements. Our primary research objective was to determine how well adults can detect children's deceptive statements overall and when children's statements are honest versus dishonest. We were especially interested in whether and by how much adults' judgment accuracy deviated from chance levels.
Adults' General Detection Abilities
Adults tend to believe they are proficient at determining the truth, and a large number of studies has been conducted examining adults' perceptions of their ability to detect deception, what types of indicators adults use to make determinations about deception, and the actual accuracy of adults' judgments (for reviews see DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010) . Findings reveal first that adults are often confident in their deception detection abilities, and second that adults regularly view behaviors such as gaze aversion (avoiding eye contact), fidgeting, nervousness, incoherent responses, and facial expressions as being indicative of someone lying rather than telling the truth (The Global Deception Research Team, 2006) . And third, despite adults' confidence and perceptions that there are clear behavioral markers of deception, adults' actual deception detection accuracy is largely unimpressive, with accuracy rates hovering only slightly above chance (e.g., 55%), as reflected, for example, in several meta-analyses of adults' detection accuracy of other adults (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980; Feeley, & Young, 2000; Vrij, 2000) . People are somewhat better at classifying honest statements as truthful (61%) than dishonest statements as lies (47%), a so-called "truth bias" (Bond & DePaulo, 2006 ; see also Vrij, 2000) . However, more confident adults are not necessarily more accurate (DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997) , and professionals (e.g., police officers or clinical psychologists) are often no more accurate than laypersons (DePaulo et al., 1997; Garrido, Masip, & Herrero, 2004) .
Adults evaluate deception not only in other adults but, as mentioned, at times in children, whose lies carry potential significance for themselves, their family, and even their broader community. A sizable body of research has evaluated how well children can actually maintain lies. Evidence indicates, for example, that even relatively young children can maintain at least some types of lies (Lyon, Malloy, Quas, & Talwar, 2008; Newton, Reddy, & Bull, 2000) , particularly those that involve denying an event rather than alleging a falsehood. At the same time, however, leakage, defined as verbal or nonverbal indicators of deception, is quite common at young ages (Feldman & White, 1980; Talwar & Lee, 2002a) . With age, children's ability to maintain a cogent lie, the range of types of lies (e.g., polite or prosocial and instrumental or antisocial) children produce, and children's ability to control leakage while lying all increase (e.g., Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 1979; Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a) . In addition, children gradually become better able to elaborate on falsehoods with supporting statements and behaviors, thereby making their lie perhaps more plausible (Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007) .
The Present Study
In light of extant research with adults, we expected some general trends to emerge in the current meta-analysis. For instance, we hypothesized that adults would perform better than chance at detecting deception in children, given that children often exhibit some signs of leakage when engaged in effortful deception and adults are slightly better than chance even when detecting deception in other adults. At the same time, considering that adults at times view children as unlikely to lie Quas, Thompson, & Clarke-Stewart, 2005; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2006) at least through middle childhood, we further anticipated a truth bias similar to that observed when adults are asked about deceptions in other adults, whereby adults are better at identifying honest than dishonest reports (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Street & Richardson, 2015) . Beyond testing these general expectations, we also explored other potential sources of influence on adults' judgments, including the level confidence in their judgments, adults' status (i.e., a professional who works with children vs. a layperson), children's age, and the type of study design.
Sources of Variability in Adults' Detection Abilities
Judgment confidence. The adult deception detection literature finds that the relation between judgment confidence and accuracy is inconsistent or meager (DePaulo et al., 1997) . Because the literature on this relation is mainly based on adults, it is still unknown whether or not this finding is generalizable to children. In a range of decision-making domains, the overconfidence effect, in which the levels of accuracy achieved are typically too low to justify the high levels of confidence reported by participants, has been empirically supported (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999 ). We would expect, then, that adults will usually be confident in their judgments of children's statements as well. However, adults may be able to pick up on children's difficulty masking behavioral indicators of deception, which should increase their accuracy and confidence concurrently. On the other hand, if adults' performance is low we would expect the findings to align with the adult literature and there will be no relation between judgment confidence and lie-detection accuracy.
Professional status. Professionals who work with children in legal, clinical, and educational settings regularly assess the veracity of children's statements; therefore, it is necessary to get a general sense of how well they perform on average and whether or not their performance differs from lay person accuracy. In adults, group differences rarely emerge in deception detection accuracy, but this literature offers some insights into child deception detection. Research that focuses on testing individual differences between the adults attempting to detect lies tends to find low variability (e.g., Vrij et al., 2010 ) and, instead, shows that detectability is often dependent on the lie-teller's ability to deceive (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) . In children, some professionals have extensive training in cognitive development and children's competencies. Hence, these professionals may be especially sensitive to leakage, or rather verbal and nonverbal cues indicative of deception in children (Crossman & Lewis, 2006; Talwar, Crossman, Williams, & Muir, 2011) . On the basis of these findings, we predicted that professional groups with advanced knowledge and experience concerning children's cognitive competencies would outperform laypersons on average.
Children's age. We were also interested in whether children's age would affect adults' detection abilities. On the one hand, lying is cognitively demanding for children (as it is for adults), and maintaining a cogent lie demands cognitive resources that children could otherwise use to monitor their task performance (see Doherty-Sneddon, Bonner, & Bruce, 2001 ). This lack of monitoring might lead to a reduction in the sophistication or consistency of the lie (Vrij, 2000) or an increase in nonverbal behaviors indicative of deception. Because young children have limited cognitive capacity, working memory, and executive functioning skills (Case, 1992; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2008) than older children, younger children are likely to be particularly adversely affected by the cognitive demands of lying, leading to high levels of leakage. Such is often the case, both when verbal indicators of deception (e.g., revealing incriminating information or failing to conceal details about which children should be unaware) and nonverbal indicators of deception (e.g., smiling) are examined (e.g., Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 1979; Talwar & Lee, 2002a) . Insofar as adults pick up on these cues, adults should be best at detecting deception in younger children, or at least better compared to older children and adolescents.
On the other hand, such a possibility assumes that adults actually know which behaviors are indicative of deception in children. Gaze aversion, for instance, is commonly viewed as a sign of deception (e.g., The Global Deception Research Team, 2006 ). Yet gaze aversion in children can occur when tasks are particularly difficult (Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner, Longbotham, & Doyle, 2002; Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005) . Some deception studies have failed to uncover differences in gaze aversion based on honesty, although differences are more likely to emerge in young children relative to adolescents or adults (e.g., McCarthy & Lee, 2009) . In other words, the cues on which adults rely to evaluate honesty often are not valid. Moreover, by the time children hit the later school-age years, the children's lies are often as sophisticated as teenagers' lies, and their nonverbal leakage is no This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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different (e.g., denying a transgression; Lee, 2013; McCarthy & Lee, 2009 ). Thus, behaviors indicative of deception may only reliably distinguish young children from those who are older and may not discriminate children in middle childhood and up. This prediction was tested in the current investigation. Study characteristics. A final question concerned whether the type of paradigm used to elicit deception affects adults' detection accuracy. These analyses included smaller subsets of studies and were exploratory in nature. We were, however, still able to develop some hypotheses, given that the deception procedures vary in the cognitive load they place on children. For example, deception tasks that require children to generate an alternative explanation rather than simply confirm or deny a behavior are potentially more difficult for children (and thus more likely to be correctly identified as a lie) precisely because of their demands, leaving fewer resources available for children to generate and then maintain a cogent lie (Lee, 2013) . Similarly, receiving adult assistance in the form of coaching may make children's lies appear more convincing Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull 2002) and result in lower detection accuracy rates, whereas detection rates may be highest when study procedures involve children generating their own lies. We might also expect that the amount of cognitive load would influence lies about a transgression, where stakes, salience, and parallels to involvement in the legal system are fairly high (NysseCarris, Bottoms, & Salerno, 2011), compared to lies about common day-to-day events.
In light of this possibility, we distinguished studies based on how the lie was generated as well as whether or not the lie was associated with a transgression (see Table 1 ). First, children could be enticed to generate their own lie or be coached, explicitly or implicitly, by an adult. The former includes authentic lies generated by the child in the moment, and the studies provide insight into how children behave when lying on their own accord. The latter involves lying in response to a request from someone else, where adults either explicitly coach children regarding the content of their false statements (i.e., ask the child to misstate specific information about a recent event they experienced) or implicitly coach children by asking them to "trick" an interviewer but not providing explicit instructions on what to say. In a second paradigm grouping, the child could either lie about their own transgression, about another person's misdeed that they witnessed, or about an innocuous situation that did not involve any wrongdoing.
For example, perhaps the most well-known and studied scenario is the classic temptation resistance paradigm (e.g., Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989) , in which children are left alone in a room with an exciting toy placed behind them and are explicitly told not to turn around and not to look at the toy. Upon returning, the experimenter asks children whether or not they turned around and looked at the toy, a question to which a majority of children lie (Crossman & Lewis, 2006; Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Renaud, & Conway, 2015) . Some studies have added questions asking children to guess the name of the forbidden toy (e.g., Buzz Lightyear; Leach et al., 2009 ). Children's responses are typically recorded on video. Adult decision-makers then view several of these brief videotaped interviews in succession and indicate whether the child is telling the truth or not. This scenario produces authentic lies that the child generates herself in response to a minor transgression that she committed.
Method Study Selection
To be included in the analyses, studies must have had adult participants (herein "receivers") making judgments about the veracity of children's honest and dishonest statements (herein "senders") without assistance from detection aids (e.g., criteria-based content analysis [CBCA] or polygraphy). All samples of adult receivers were independent, but a few studies did share the same stimuli (child senders). However, the small amount of sender interdependence did not affect results, as the findings held when effect sizes from these studies were excluded.
Studies were excluded if they were manipulating facial expressions only (e.g., no volume; Boerner, Chambers, Craig, Pillai Riddell, & Parker 2013; Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 1979; Morency & Krauss, 1982; Swerts, 2012) . These experiments were more cognitive in nature, often sacrificing ecological validity to Note. No significant differences were detected among average effect sizes for any paradigm category or type. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
examine more nuanced hypotheses regarding children's abilities to suppress affect, and thus the investigations are substantively different from the other child deception detection studies. Studies were not included if the children's false statements were not intentionally deceptive. Some studies, for example, induce false statements by misleading children with suggestive techniques (e.g., Block et al., 2012; Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994; Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, Schaaf, & Kenney, 2002) , or the false statements may have occurred naturally through cognitive memory errors (e.g., encoding, storage, and retrieval; Ball & O'Callaghan, 2001) , and, although their statements were false, their intentions were not to purposely deceive the interviewer.
Other inclusion criteria were as follows: We operationalized child senders as age 17 or under. Thus, we excluded studies in which receivers only judged adult senders. The studies needed to provide a numeric metric for the rate at which receivers accurately (or inaccurately) detected sender's statements or provide a comparison to chance statistic. Often times, this was expressed as an overall accuracy rate (i.e., the number of correct classifications divided by the total number of classifications made), although some studies decomposed the rate by the different types of classifications (e.g., accuracy rates for honest statements and dishonest statements). From each study, the following variables were coded (when possible): (a) number of (adult) receivers, (b) number of (child) senders, (c) receiver's professional status, (d) lie type (i.e., false report or false denial), (e) method for generating lies, and (f) transgression type (i.e., child's transgression, other's transgression, or no transgression). Accuracy rate (decomposed or not) and the corresponding standard deviations were noted. To assess the reliability of the coding, these variables and the effect sizes were coded by two independent raters for a random sample of 20% of the experiments. The interrater reliability was high across the variables (all Kappas Ͼ 0.9). Any discrepancies were resolved through discussion.
A variety of methods has been used to find published and unpublished studies of adult deception detection of child senders. We began with a computer-based search using PsycINFO, ProQuest, EBSCO, WorldCat, PsycLit and Google Scholar search engines for studies published prior to September 2015 with keywords accuracy, judgment, detect, child, deception, false statements, lie, or truth, along with several variants and conjunctions of these terms. Once relevant studies were identified, their reference sections were examined for other relevant studies; the reference section of numerous nonempirical articles was also examined for potentially relevant studies. Additionally, an email request was sent to authors of published research requesting the provision of any unpublished studies and necessary statistical clarification, as well as recommendations for other researchers that could be contacted regarding possible unpublished research studies.
This process yielded 45 eligible experiments, of which 40 were published and 5 were unpublished. The earliest was dated 1989, and half were from 2007 or later. These studies included a total of 7,893 adult receivers and 1,858 child senders whose ages ranged from 3 to 15. Twelve experiments used some type of "professional receiver," which could be a classroom teacher, social worker, police officer, customs officer, clinician, researcher/psychologist, early education specialist, court judge, prosecutor, or other justice system professional. The majority of studies examined accuracy at detecting false reports (28 experiments) rather than false denials (13 experiments), while 4 used both types of lies.
We used Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA) software to combine effect sizes from different data types and draw statistical conclusions. Relevant statistical information was culled from each experiment or acquired from the authors and converted to a common metric. This was then averaged using a procedure that weights each contribution on the basis of the sample size for that particular effect. We report Cohen's d because of its commonness in the social sciences and its ability to explain and convert between multiple types of effects (Cohen, 1992) . When applicable, correlation coefficients (r) are reported as well. Random effects models were used to allow for inferences to a broader population than the population from the studies that have been conducted (Hoyle, 1999; Schmidt, Oh, & Hayes, 2009) . Random effects models assume that the true effect size may vary across studies and tempers the weights appropriately so that the overall effect size is not overly influenced by any single experiment (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009 ). The Q statistic, based on analysis of variance, was used to evaluate differences between average effect sizes of subgroups with ␣ ϭ .05.
Results

Overall Accuracy
In every experiment receivers classified messages as lies or truths. Forty-three experiments reported a mean percentage correct (two studies did not report an overall rate, only the comparison to chance statistic). Across these, the unweighted mean percent correct was 54.34% and the weighted mean was 53.97%, with a range of 32% to 68% and a median percentage of 55%. Comparisons of the observed accuracy rate to chance (45 effect sizes, n ϭ 7,893) revealed levels in performance at detecting true and false statements greater than chance, Cohen's d ϭ 0.242, 95% CI [0.119, 0.365]. Individual Cohen's d effect sizes ranged from Ϫ0.884 to 1.941 (see Figure 1) . It should be noted that 22 of the 45 effect sizes on their own showed a statistically significant effect for accuracy differing from chance levels; of these, 6 examined the rate of accuracy below chance and 16 examined the rate above chance. Given significant heterogeneity in effect sizes (I 2 ϭ 92.9%, Q[44] ϭ 616.45, p Ͻ .001), we tested moderators that could potentially account for between-study differences.
Accuracy detecting lies. There were 41 effect sizes for adult receivers' ability to correctly classify a false statement as dishonest. The unweighted mean percent correct for lie classifications was 49.36% and the weighted mean was 47.52% with a range of 26% to 70% and median of 49.55%. Analyses directly comparing the accuracy of classifying false statements as dishonest to chance was nonsignificant, Cohen's d ϭ Ϫ0.094, 95% CI [Ϫ0.201, 0.014], indicating that, across all studies, receivers performed at chance when classifying false statements as dishonest. Individual Cohen's d effect sizes ranged from Ϫ1.432 to 0.547 (see top panel of Figure 1 ). This effect was statistically significant in 18 of the 41 individual effect sizes. The weighted mean percent correct was calculated for false reports (M ϭ 47.76%) and false denials (M ϭ 46.21%). Subgroup analyses on the lie type (i.e., false report or false denial) revealed that the means did not significantly differ, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Q(1) ϭ 0.198, p ϭ .656. In other words, receivers were not more accurate at identifying false reports compared to false denials. Accuracy detecting truths. There were 41 effect sizes for adult receivers' ability to classify a true statement as an honest statement. The unweighted mean percent correct was 59.65% and the weighted mean was 63.8%, with a range of 29% to 95% and median of 61%. Analyses directly comparing accuracy of classifying true statements as honest to chance detected a statistically significant positive effect, Cohen's d ϭ 0.338, 95% CI [0.157, 0.519] (see middle panel of Figure 1 ). A total of 26 of the 41 effect sizes on their own showed a significant difference from chance level at p Ͻ .05; Individual Cohen's d effect sizes ranged from Ϫ1.167 to 3.0, but the largest value was an outlier (see Figure  1) , specifically from the only study in which mothers judged their own children's statements. All of these were true reports, and just about every mother correctly believed their child's statement (Talwar, Renaud, & Conway, 2015) . The overall effect size did not change significantly when this outlier was excluded from the analysis. The weighted mean percent correct was calculated for true reports (M ϭ 62.11%) and true denials (M ϭ 69.53%). Subgroup analyses of truth type (i.e., true report or true denial) revealed that these means did not significantly differ, Q(1) ϭ 2.362, p ϭ .124.
Truth-lie discrimination. In order to determine adult receivers' average ability to differentiate a truth from a lie, the difference between the average effect sizes for detecting truths and detecting lies was compared through a subgroup analysis. This difference was significant (Q(1) ϭ 16.186, p Ͻ .001) and revealed that adults showed greater detection performance when judging truths compared to lies.
Confidence-accuracy correlation. The correlation between receivers' judgment confidence and the accuracy of their judgment (17 effect sizes) showed a small albeit statistically significant effect, r ϭ .068, 95% CI [0.001, 0.136]. Higher confidence was associated with a higher rate of accuracy (i.e., calling a false statement dishonest and calling a true statement honest). Note that the correlations reported in individual studies ranged from r ϭ Ϫ0.09 to 0.287.
Professional and lay accuracy. There were 25 effect sizes (from 12 experiments) for which professionals (n ϭ 873) classified statements as either honest or dishonest. Their unweighted mean percent correct classifications was 56.07% and the weighted mean was 55.97%, with a range of 44% to 70% and a median of 56%. Analyses comparing the professionals' accuracy rate to chance revealed a statistically significant effect, Cohen's d ϭ 0.491, 95% CI [0.239, 0.743]. Fourteen of the 25 individual effect sizes on their own showed a significant difference from chance at p Ͻ .05. Individual Cohen's d effect sizes ranged from Ϫ0.998 to 1.721.
The accuracy rate of lay people, primarily undergraduates, was examined across 40 effect sizes (n ϭ 6,380). Their unweighted mean percent correct truth/lie classifications was 53.91% and the weighted mean was 53.7%, ranging 32% to 66.5%, median ϭ 53.25%. Analyses directly comparing the accuracy rate to chance revealed a statistically significant effect, Cohen Accuracy and children's age. The next set of analyses concerned whether adult receivers' accuracy varied depending on the age of the sender. Sixteen studies conducted age comparisons between "younger" and "older" children. However, the ages that constituted "younger" versus "older" children varied across the This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
studies: Some considered 3-to 5-year-olds to be "young" whereas others consider ages 6 to 8 to be "young." In order to increase the consistency and the granularity of analysis, we grouped senders as follows: young (sender ages 3-5); middle (sender ages 6 -9); and old (sender ages 10 -15). Three types of age comparisons could then be conducted: young-middle, middle-old, and young-old. Subgroup analyses between the three group comparisons revealed that the differences in the effect sizes were not significant Q(2) ϭ 5.594, p ϭ .061. Adults' accuracy rates did not differ between the young-middle age comparison (k ϭ 8, p ϭ .730), nor did they differ in the middle-old age comparison (k ϭ 3, p ϭ .939). Across the 5 studies that compared adult detection accuracy rates among all three young, middle, and older groups of children, adults were more accurate only with the youngest age group relative to the oldest age group (Cohen's d ϭ 0.238, 95% CI [0.112, 0.356]). The mean adult accuracy rate when detecting young senders was 60.05% (SD ϭ 6.68%), the mean accuracy rate for middle senders was 56.73% (SD ϭ 7.9%), and the mean accuracy rate for old senders was 52.45% (SD ϭ 10.89%). Accuracy across paradigm categories. Subgroup analyses were conducted to examine whether the method for generating lies (i.e., self-generated, explicit coaching, or implicit coaching) or the transgression paradigm type (i.e., child's transgression, other's transgression, or no transgression) affected truth/lie detection. The analyses revealed that receivers' average accuracy rates did not differ as a function of either the method used to generate the lie or the transgression paradigm type, Q(2) ϭ 4.412, p ϭ .11; Q(2) ϭ 0.271, p ϭ .873, respectively (see Table 1 for each paradigm type's average effect size).
Potential publication bias. If only large or significant effects are published while nonsignificant findings are relegated to the "file drawer," it is possible that the effects reported here could be inflated (Rosenthal, 1979) . Efforts were made to reduce this possibility by contacting published authors in an effort to locate unpublished findings, whether or not they are significant; our analyses included all such findings. To empirically test for the possibility of publication bias, we further calculated Rosenthal's fail-safe N (Rosenthal, 1979) , which gives the number of studies with a null effect that would need to be added in order to make the overall accuracy comparison to chance no longer significant at p Ͻ .05. This number was estimated at 1,515 studies for the overall accuracy-chance comparison (p Ͻ .001).
1 As it is unlikely that this many unpublished studies are filed away, we can conclude with some confidence that the present results are not solely the result of any practices related to selective publishing.
Discussion
The overarching purpose of the present meta-analysis was to synthesize findings from extant research on adults' ability to detect deception in children in order to generate clearer conclusions about how well adults can discern truthful and intentionally false statements provided by children. In all studies included in the metaanalysis, adults viewed children, usually on videotape, providing true or false answers to questions and attempted to classify those answers as honest or dishonest. Across studies and type of statement, the average mean percent correct was significantly above chance, at 54%, and amounted to a small effect size (d ϭ 0.242). This average is comparable to that obtained in meta-analyses of studies examining adults' ability to detect deception in adults, with these percentages averaging between 54% and 57% (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 1980) . Thus, in general, adults do not appear more proficient at detecting deception in children than in adults, despite some reasons to suspect that children's more limited cognitive and deceptive abilities would render their true and false statements more easily discernable.
Subgroup analyses, however, revealed some factors that affected adults' deception detection accuracy. Consistent with the literature examining deception detection in adult senders (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) , higher accuracy was detected when classifying children's true statements as such than when classifying lies as such. One possible explanation for this involves a type of anchoring, in which most people believe that social interactions are honest and often fail to sufficiently adjust this inclination, thus resulting in a bias toward their initial position (Vrij et al., 2010) . In this case, the predisposition would be that children are truthful. When judging deceptive statements by children, however, adults' performance did not differ from chance, and this performance did not vary depending on whether the statement reflected a false report or false denial. These findings could be interpreted as either that adults are not adept at detecting children's intentionally false statements or that children are somewhat effective in their use of deception (see Talwar, Crossman, Williams, & Muir, 2011) .
Overall, these levels of accuracy and tendency toward a response bias have important implications for individuals who are charged with the difficult task of evaluating the veracity of children's statements, particularly individuals who do so in forensic settings. These professionals need to be informed of their potential limitations, and that they ought not to place too much faith in their ability to detect deception in children (see also Vrij, 2002) but instead, when situations are warranted, to consider possibilities of both honest and dishonest statements, both in terms of true and false allegations and also true and false denials.
We were also interested in the links between judgment confidence and accuracy, given long-standing debates about whether confidence is informative as to the likely accuracy of judgments (DePaulo et al., 1997) . Somewhat contrary to the adult deception detection literature, which has not uncovered any consistent associations, a statistically significant relation emerged between how confident adults were in their evaluation of the veracity of children's reports and the accuracy of that evaluation. Despite this trend, however, the correlation, r ϭ .068, was small and its practical significance is limited. Although we can tentatively conclude that adults are more confident in their decisions when they have made a correct classification, we do not advise that adult receivers use confidence as a strong cue for accuracy; the relation between confidence and accuracy is meager at best. This finding should prompt further investigation into why this might be for children but not adults. Because detection accuracy rates tend not to differ between child and adult populations, there might be something unique about communicating with children that helps to link their judgment confidence and accuracy.
Two other important factors we considered were characteristics of the receiver and the sender, namely the adult receivers' training or expertise with children and the child sender's age. Although no reliable individual differences have been uncovered in the literature with adult receivers (Vrij, 2004) , professionals such as social workers, teachers, and even police officers, especially the first two, likely have more experience with children, and thus their average accuracy rates may be superior compared to laypersons. Indeed, the results revealed a very small difference between professional (56%) and layperson (54%) overall accuracy rates. Practically speaking, however, this advantage is slim, and professionals' lack of particular skill in detecting deception is especially concerning in light of evidence that laypersons often believe the professionals are highly skilled (e.g., Quas et al., 2005) .
It is worth noting that somewhat different results were reported by Amado, Arce, and Farina (2015) in a recent meta-analysis comparing content-based criterion analysis (CBCA) scores between children's reports of truthful versus potentially untruthful reports. CBCA is a systematic method of evaluating narratives for both type and quantity of information across various criteria (e.g., unusual details, spontaneous corrections, reproduction of conversations) believed to differ between true and false narratives (Griesel, Ternes, Schraml, Cooper, & Yuille, 2013; Vrij, 2008) . Adults need to be trained to code interview transcripts for CBCA. Thus, perhaps, with sufficient training on a coding scheme like CBCA, and assuming such a scheme is effective at truly discriminating among honest and dishonest reports from children, larger differences between laypersons and professionals would emerge. More broadly, though, laypersons and professionals alike need to be aware of their own (and each other's) limitations so that their evaluations are not given undue weight.
The ability to discriminate truths/lies as a function of the age of the child, although not statistically significant, was in the expected developmental direction. However, many of the constituent studies did not find a different rate of accuracy between "young" children and "old" children, and many of the studies that did find an effect on accuracy were inconsistent: Some reported higher rates for young children (e.g., Westcott, Davies, & Clifford, 1991) , and others reported higher rates for old children (e.g., Vrij, Akehurst, Brown, & Mann, 2006) . Adding to this confusion is no consistent operational definition of what ages correspond to "old" and "young" children. To make a consistent comparison across age groups, we utilized our own operationalization of young (age 3 to 5), middle (age 6 to 9) and old (age 10 to 15) children and reanalyzed the extant data; however, this regrouping yielded a small number of studies per comparison group. This analysis revealed that adults were more accurate with the youngest children (60%) relative to middle (56.7%) and older (52.5%) aged children. Therefore, the children tended to adhere to the developmental expectations that they become increasingly skilled liars as they age.
More research is clearly necessary to help reconcile the inconsistency of the findings on the relation between accuracy of deception detection and age of the child sender. There are likely to be a number of moderators (e.g., gender of child sender; type of lie; high or low stakes; etc.) that might interact with the age of sender; these interactive effects could influence both the ability of the child to deceive as well as the ability of an adult to detect that deception. For instance, developmental differences in children's scores have been found on several of the criteria embedded in CBCA coding, with higher scores indicative of increased likelihood of a truthful report, being positively related to age (Hershkowitz, Lamb, Sternberg, & Esplin, 1997; Santtila, Roppola, Runtti, & Niemi, 2000) . Because adults must be trained to use CBCA, it is possible that children's age may interact with certain types of professional training to influence some adults' detection abilities.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Despite the unique contribution of the current meta-analysis in synthesizing the extant findings, the possible limitations inherent to meta-analyses must be noted. It is not uncommon to find a high level of heterogeneity in reviews of deception detection research (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007) because studies examining deception detection rarely use a uniform methodology and instead seek to examine a variety of possible factors that could potentially influence the results. Moderator analyses evaluated whether several key factors reliably affected the results. However, other factors, such as high and low stakes report, length of time between the target event and interview, motivation, and presentation mode, were not included here because of insufficient numbers of studies testing such factors. Their lack of inclusion could affect the reported results in at least two ways. First, not including them could increase error variance, thereby understating the reported effect sizes. Second, not including them could lead to important effects going undetected. A remedy to these concerns is to conduct additional research with more standardized methods. However, even with the heterogeneity of methodologies, the fact that some consistent trends emerged and the fact that several of the findings reported here converge with those obtained with adult senders lend support to the overall trends observed and the conclusions that were generated.
A promising direction for improving detection accuracy comes from developmental studies attempting to further discern how well children can lie, under what conditions, and how children's behavior and language vary as a function of lie-telling versus truthtelling. The current meta-analysis found no significant differences in adult's average accuracy rates when children received adult assistance in the form of coaching compared to children generating their own lies, nor did accuracy rates differ between lies about a transgression (either their own or witnessing another person) and lies about common day-to-day events. Although individual accuracy rates were consistently at or near chance when explicit coaching was used, other paradigm distinctions included fairly wide ranges of variability (see Table 1 ), and one possible explanation for the non-significant findings is that fewer studies have examined these various paradigm types and more research is necessary for clarification. Another possibility is that these factors do not function as moderators. Thus, future work disentangling other possible moderators would be informative. Studies of interest are those that uncover any reliable indicators of deception in children or positive influences on honest disclosures. For example, interview strategies such as rapport building and reassurance can have positive effects on children's truth-telling behavior . Other factors involving the logistics of the child interviews could also have important effects on adult accuracy and should be considered in future research. Many of the studies included in this This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
meta-analysis only asked the children direct yes or no questions that resulted in interviews only seconds long. The interviews were often brief (less than one minute) and did not include baseline information or responses from children. Comparing question types, interview length, narratives versus forced choice, and formal versus informal interview styles could shed light on factors that affect accuracy, particularly across age, given the dramatic effects that children's age has on their responses to different question types (see Andrews, Ahern, Stolzenberg, & Lyon., 2016; Lyon, 2014) . Additionally, the included studies usually used only one (true or false) account from each child (i.e., a between-child design) rather than comparing truth and lie detection accuracy within child samples. Continuing to shift to a within-sender focus and determining individual differences that influence their detectability would add significant insight into how detection abilities can be improved (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981) . Whether these findings replicate or generalize to different contexts and different paradigms are important questions that need to be addressed by further research. If reliable indicators of deception in children can be determined, then the next step will be to assess whether adults can be taught to effectively use those markers. Despite some limitations, and despite the need for additional research, the present meta-analysis examined several hypotheses involving the characteristics of adult receivers, child senders, and study paradigm designs and, while the findings in many ways echo the adult deception detection literature, there are also distinctive influences particular to detecting deception in children.
